In recent weeks, a company in Italy fell victim to a double ransomware compromise.
This case demonstrates how the lack of a structured DFIR (Digital Forensics & Incident Response) approach can lead to a second compromise, despite the presence of intact backups and apparently correct restore procedures.
For this reason, we have chosen to analyze the case in detail and share the main technical and methodological findings that emerged during the incident management process.
The initial response
The company’s initial response, handled internally without the involvement of a specialized Incident Response team, was limited to resetting domain administrator credentials and restoring data from backups.
Although timely, this strategy overlooked a crucial step: changing the password for the krbtgt account, a critical component in the issuance of Kerberos protocol Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs).
The failure to change the krbtgt account password allowed attackers to maintain persistent privileges even after the administrative passwords were changed.
In addition, the restoration of over 100 Windows Server instances took place without any remediation, reintroducing backdoors and persistence mechanisms previously installed by threat actors into production.
Persistence, dwell time, and secondary compromise
It is essential to remember that the encryption phase is only the final act of a compromise.
The so-called dwell time, i.e., the period during which the attacker remains silent within the infrastructure, can extend for weeks, during which Command & Control (C2) channels, elevated privileges, and persistence distributed across multiple systems are created.
In the case analyzed, the absence of an eradication phase allowed the TAs to exploit Golden Tickets generated by the compromised krbtgt key, reactivate dormant web shells and reverse shells, and use scheduled tasks and malicious services remaining in backups, continuing to move laterally via RDP tunneling and C2 beacons.
The result was a second compromise a few weeks later, with similar dynamics and a considerable operational impact.
DFIR intervention and containment strategy
After the second compromise, the company finally involved CYBEROO’s Incident Response team, adopting a structured approach based on DFIR principles. We performed:
- Complete reset of the krbtgt account password with double change, invalidating previously generated TGTs
- Large-scale threat hunting with YARA and DFIR agents to identify persistence and IOCs (Indicators of Compromise)
- Eradication of backdoors
- Segmentation review and policy hardening to reduce the attack surface and limit future lateral movements.
Immutable backups and restore limits
The availability of immutable backups has been a strong point in preserving data integrity, but it has not guaranteed the overall security of the environment.
Without thorough forensic triage, log analysis, and threat eradication, the risk of further compromise remains high.
Data restoration does not break the attack chain if persistence vectors are not systematically identified and removed.
Beyond restore: restoring trust in systems
Managing a ransomware incident cannot be reduced to simply restoring data or changing passwords.
A truly effective approach must include immediate containment, Active Directory remediation, krbtgt account password reset, complete removal of persistence mechanisms, and continuous post-incident monitoring, ideally supported by an MDR (Managed Detection & Response) solution.
Without a rigorous DFIR process, the risk of further compromise is extremely high, with direct consequences for business continuity, operating costs, and production capacity.
In extreme scenarios, failure to manage the response correctly can lead to production stoppages and the adoption of extraordinary measures, such as layoffs. This experience shows that data restoration is not the end of the incident, but only the beginning of the process of regaining trust in one’s systems.
Only a scientific and methodologically sound approach, based on forensic analysis, eradication, and post-incident monitoring, can guarantee a real return to cybersecurity.
By Andrea Coli – Incident Response Manager, CYBEROO