Smart mobility is one of the pillars of the energy transition. Charging stations, electric vehicles and cloud management platforms create a distributed and connected ecosystem that brings clear benefits in terms of sustainability and efficiency. However, this interconnection introduces an extended attack surface, affecting both embedded column systems and backend software architectures and the vehicles themselves.
The objective of this article is to describe in a technical manner the main vulnerabilities, the attack patterns observed and the countermeasures necessary to protect electric mobility and the infrastructures connected to it.
Charging column attachment surface
Charging stations are not just hardware devices, but complex systems with firmware, API interfaces and communication protocols. Among the most relevant critical points:
- OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol): Vulnerable to man-in-the-middle and injection if not protected by TLS and robust certificates
- Cloud APIs and mobile apps: Can expose accessible endpoints with weak or unsecured tokens
- Unsigned firmware: allows upload of arbitrary code
- PLC (Power Line Communication): the data transmission between EV and column, if not encrypted, is interceptable and modifiable.
Observed techniques of compromise
Typical attacks include:
- Quishing: malicious QR code superimposed on the column to steal credentials and payment data
- OCPP interception: session log manipulation, charging blocking or billing alteration
- Firmware tampering: Installation of modified firmware that disables critical controls (e.g. current limits)
- Coordinated network attacks: simultaneous switching on/off of compromised columns to generate local instability
- Backend compromise: by leveraging valid credentials, the attacker manipulates CI/CD pipelines and controls hundreds of devices.

Fig. 1 – Flow of an AitM attack on OCPP
Electric vehicles as target
Modern cars integrate dozens of ECUs interconnected via CAN bus, with OTA and V2X functions. The main vulnerabilities:
- Infotainment as entry point via Wi-Fi/Bluetooth
- Unsigned OTAs: installation of malicious firmware
- Reverse engineering (Chimaera): extraction of cryptographic keys and arbitrary commands on the CAN bus
- Unencrypted V2G/V2X: spoofing and interception of messages.
Simplified OTA attack:
import requests
url = “https://update.ev-vendor.com/ota”files = {“firmware”: open(“rogue_fw.bin”,”rb”)}
headers = {“Authorization”: “Bearer <token_compromesso>”}r = requests.post(url, files=files, headers=headers)print(r.status_code)
If digital signature verification is missing, the vehicle installs compromised firmware.

Fig. 2 – Flow of a V2G attack on PLC
Technical countermeasures
The following countermeasures should be taken to mitigate the risks:
- MDR services and AI-based anomaly detection
- TLS 1.3 + HSM certificates on each communication channel
- Firmware signing with boot-time verification
- Continuous penetration testing on OCPP, API and firmware
- Shield on API to block automated traffic
- Zero Trust: authentication and authorization for each actor
- Network segmentation to isolate the operational part from the management part
- Backups and disaster recovery plans for resilience against ransomware.
Regulations and standards
- UNECE WP.29 (R155): Cybersecurity Management System obligation in vehicles
- ISO/SAE 21434: secure development of automotive software and systems
- NIS2 Directive: Security requirements for critical operators, including charging
- ENISA and CERT-AgID guidelines: best practices for risk assessment and incident response.
Ultimately
E-mobility is just as critical an infrastructure as traditional IT networks. Colonnines and vehicles are targets of attacks that combine phishing, firmware exploitation and protocol compromise. A proactive approach, based on encryption, integrity verification, continuous monitoring and regulatory compliance, is key to ensuring resilience and trust.
Analysis by Vasily Kononov – Threat Intelligence Lead, CYBEROO